Centralized Software-Defined Networking (cSDN) offers flexible and programmable control of networks but suffers from scalability and reliability issues due to its reliance on centralized controllers. Decentralized SDN (dSDN) alleviates these concerns by distributing control across multiple local controllers, yet this architecture remains highly vulnerable to Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel detection and mitigation framework tailored for dSDN environments. The framework leverages lightweight port-level statistics combined with prompt engineering and in-context learning, enabling the DeepSeek-v3 Large Language Model (LLM) to classify traffic as benign or malicious without requiring fine-tuning or retraining. Once an anomaly is detected, mitigation is enforced directly at the attacker's port, ensuring that malicious traffic is blocked at their origin while normal traffic remains unaffected. An automatic recovery mechanism restores normal operation after the attack inactivity, ensuring both security and availability. Experimental evaluation under diverse DDoS attack scenarios demonstrates that the proposed approach achieves near-perfect detection, with 99.99% accuracy, 99.97% precision, 100% recall, 99.98% F1-score, and an AUC of 1.0. These results highlight the effectiveness of combining distributed monitoring with zero-training LLM inference, providing a proactive and scalable defense mechanism for securing dSDN infrastructures against DDoS threats.
翻译:集中式软件定义网络(cSDN)提供了灵活且可编程的网络控制,但由于其依赖集中式控制器,存在可扩展性和可靠性问题。去中心化SDN(dSDN)通过将控制权分布到多个本地控制器来缓解这些问题,然而该架构仍极易受到分布式拒绝服务(DDoS)攻击。本文提出了一种专为dSDN环境设计的新型检测与缓解框架。该框架利用轻量级端口级统计信息,结合提示工程与上下文学习,使DeepSeek-v3大语言模型(LLM)能够在不需微调或重新训练的情况下,将流量分类为良性或恶意。一旦检测到异常,缓解措施直接在攻击者端口执行,确保恶意流量在其源头被阻断,而正常流量不受影响。攻击停止后,自动恢复机制可恢复正常运行,保障安全性与可用性。在多种DDoS攻击场景下的实验评估表明,所提方法实现了近乎完美的检测性能:准确率99.99%、精确率99.97%、召回率100%、F1分数99.98%,AUC为1.0。这些结果凸显了分布式监控与零训练LLM推理相结合的有效性,为保护dSDN基础设施免受DDoS威胁提供了一种主动且可扩展的防御机制。