The vulnerability of the Global Positioning System (GPS) against spoofing is known for quite some time. Also, the positioning and navigation of most semi-autonomous and autonomous drones are dependent on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals. In prior work, simplistic or asynchronous GPS spoofing was found to be a simple, efficient, and effective cyber attack against L1 GPS or GNSS dependent commercial drones. In this paper, first we make some important observations on asynchronous GPS spoofing attacks on drones presented in prior research literature. Then, we design an asynchronous GPS spoofing attack plan. Next, we test the effectiveness of this attack against GNSS receivers (high volume consumer devices based on Android mobile phones) of different capabilities and a commercial drone (DJI Mavic 2 Pro) under various conditions. Finally, we present several novel insights based on the results of the tests.
翻译：全球定位系统(GPS)在对抗愚弄上的脆弱性已经众所周知了相当长一段时间了。此外,大多数半自主和自主无人驾驶飞机的定位和导航取决于全球导航卫星系统的信号。以前的工作发现,简单或无同步的GPS假冒是针对L1全球定位系统或依赖GNSS的商用无人驾驶飞机的简单、高效和有效的网络攻击。在本文件中,我们首先对以往研究文献中出现的对无人驾驶飞机的无同步全球定位系统攻击作了一些重要观察。然后,我们设计了一个无同步的GPS假射攻击计划。接下来,我们测试了这次攻击对不同能力、不同条件下的全球导航卫星系统接收器(基于Android移动电话的高容量消费装置)和商用无人驾驶飞机(DJI Mavic 2 Pro)的功效。最后,我们根据测试结果提出了一些新的见解。
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