On Incentivizing Social Information Sharing in Routing Games

We study a new incentive problem of social information sharing for location-based services (e.g., Waze and Yelp). The problem aims to crowdsource a mass of mobile users to learn massive point-of-interest (PoI) information while traveling and share it with each other as a public good. Given that crowdsourced users mind their own travel costs and possess various preferences over the PoI information along different paths, we formulate the problem as a non-atomic routing game with positive network externalities. We first show by price of anarchy (PoA) analysis that, in the absence of any incentive design, users' selfish routing on the path with the lowest cost will limit information diversity and lead to an arbitrarily large efficiency loss from the social optimum. This motivates us to explore effective incentive mechanisms to remedy while upholding individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and budget balance to ensure practical feasibility. We start by presenting an adaptive information restriction (AIR) mechanism that dynamically customizes restriction fractions, depending on the real user flows along different paths, to govern users' access to the shared PoI aggregation. We show that AIR achieves a PoA of 0.25 for homogeneous users (of identical PoI preferences over paths) and 0.125 for heterogeneous users in a typical network of two parallel paths. Further, we propose a side-payment mechanism (ASP) that adaptively charges or rewards users along certain paths. With those charges and rewards well-tailored, ASP significantly improves the PoA to 1 (optimal) and 0.5 for homogeneous and heterogeneous users in the two-path network, respectively. For a generalized network of multiple parallel paths, we further advance ASP to be able to guarantee a PoA of 0.5. Additionally, our theoretical results are well corroborated by our numerical findings.