We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. Voters may be "contingent" with different preferences in different states; or predetermined with the same preference in every state. In this setting, even if every voter is a contingent voter, agents voting according to their private information need not result in the adoption of the universally preferred alternative, because the signals can be systematically biased. We present an easy-to-deploy mechanism that elicits and aggregates the private signals from the voters, and outputs the alternative that is favored by the majority. In particular, voters truthfully reporting their signals forms a strong Bayes Nash equilibrium (where no coalition of voters can deviate and receive a better outcome).
翻译:我们考虑两种不同的选举,即选民的偏好取决于无法直接观察的州变量。每个选民都收到与州变量相关的私人信号。 选民可能在不同州有不同的偏好,或者在各州有相同的偏好。 在这一背景下,即使每个选民都是应急选民,根据自己的私人信息投票的代理人也不必导致采用普遍偏爱的替代信息,因为信号可能是系统性的偏见。 我们提出了一个容易使用的机制,它能吸引和汇总来自选民的私人信号,而产出则是大多数人支持的替代信息。 特别是,诚实地报告其信号的选民形成了一个强大的巴耶什平衡(没有选民联盟可以偏离并获得更好的结果 ) 。