We present Qatsi, a hierarchical key derivation scheme using Argon2id that generates reproducible cryptographic secrets without persistent storage. The system eliminates vault-based attack surfaces by deriving all secrets deterministically from a single high-entropy master secret and contextual layers. Outputs achieve 103-312 bits of entropy through memory-hard derivation (64-128 MiB, 16-32 iterations) and provably uniform rejection sampling over 7776-word mnemonics or 90-character passwords. We formalize the hierarchical construction, prove output uniformity, and quantify GPU attack costs: $2.4 \times 10^{16}$ years for 80-bit master secrets on single-GPU adversaries under Paranoid parameters (128 MiB memory). The implementation in Rust provides automatic memory zeroization, compile-time wordlist integrity verification, and comprehensive test coverage. Reference benchmarks on Apple M1 Pro (2021) demonstrate practical usability with 544 ms Standard mode and 2273 ms Paranoid mode single-layer derivations. Qatsi targets air-gapped systems and master credential generation where stateless reproducibility outweighs rotation flexibility.
翻译:本文提出Qatsi,一种基于Argon2id的分层密钥派生方案,可在无需持久存储的情况下生成可复现的密码学秘密。该系统通过从单个高熵主秘密及上下文层级进行确定性派生,消除了基于保险库的攻击面。通过内存强化派生(64-128 MiB,16-32次迭代)及对7776词助记词或90字符密码的可证明均匀拒绝采样,输出熵值达到103-312位。我们形式化了分层构造,证明了输出均匀性,并量化了GPU攻击成本:在Paranoid参数(128 MiB内存)下,单GPU攻击者对80位主秘密的破解需$2.4 \times 10^{16}$年。基于Rust的实现提供自动内存清零、编译时词表完整性验证和完整测试覆盖。在Apple M1 Pro(2021)上的基准测试表明其具备实际可用性:单层派生在Standard模式下耗时544 ms,Paranoid模式下耗时2273 ms。Qatsi面向气隙系统及主凭证生成场景,其中无状态可复现性优先于轮换灵活性。