Zero Knowledge Games

Zero-knowledge strategies as a form of inference and reasoning operate using the concept of zero-knowledge signaling, such that any imperfect recall or incomplete information can be attenuated for. The resulting effect of structuring a continuous game within a zero-knowledge strategy demonstrates the ability to infer, within acceptable probabilities, which approximate stage a player is in. This occurs only when an uninformed player attempts non-revealing strategies, resulting in a higher probability of failing to appear informed. Thus, an opposing player understanding their opponent is uninformed can choose a more optimal strategy. In cases where an informed player chooses a non-revealing strategy, introducing a hedge algebra as a doxastic heuristic informs feasibility levels of trust. A counter strategy employing such a hedge algebra facilitates optimal outcomes for both players, provided the trust is well placed. Given indefinite, finite sub-games leading to continued interactions based on trust, extensions to continuous games are feasible.